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BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY—OPENING THE DOOR FOR SUCCESSFUL 
LITIGATION AGAINST CLERGY AND THE CHURCH. 
 
As many recent news stories have made apparent, suits against clergy and church entities 
have become more prevalent, or at least more publicized.  Many of these suits are a result of 
sexual abuse in the Catholic Church.  “[C]lergy accused of pedophilia have garnered 
considerable press attention and the ire of the general public.”1  As stated in a recent news 
article, “[t]housands of adults—nearly 550 in Boston alone, with more to come—have filed suit 
[against the Catholic Church] over abuse they say occurred when they were boys and girls.”2   
The publicity received by church sexual abuse cases has greatly increased the public 
awareness of this issue.  However, while the media has publicized the facts involved in many of 
these cases, there has been little attention paid by the media to the First Amendment implications 
that these cases raise.3     
Tied to the rise of sexual abuse cases against the Church, cases dealing with pastoral 
counseling have also been on the rise.  Within the past decade, the frequency of lawsuits arising 
out of pastoral counseling has risen dramatically.4  Often these arise out of a sexual relationship 
that was entered into between a clergy member and a parishioner during the course of the 
counseling relationship.  Although sexual abuse of children has been the most publicized 
example of these improper sexual relationships, there are numerous examples where the basis of 
                                                 
1 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
2 Fred Bayles, Cathy Lynn Grossman & Martin Kasindorf, Priest Scandal Snowballs: Boston Case Starts a Chain 
Reaction, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 26, 2002. 
3 Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability: Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 
(2000). 
4 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By the 
Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 743 (1998). 
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the suit is a sexual relationship that was entered into between a clergy member and an adult 
woman who was seeking counseling for marital difficulties.5   
When a parishioner brings a civil suit against a clergy member or against a church entity 
based on pastoral counseling, he or she routinely asserts claims of clergy malpractice and breach 
of fiduciary duty.6  This paper will be primarily focused upon the claims of clergy malpractice 
and breach of fiduciary duty and the use of the First Amendment as a bar to those claims.  While 
no court has yet recognized a claim for clergy malpractice, numerous courts have allowed claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The first part of this article will briefly discuss the First Amendment as a bar to suits 
against church entities and clergy.  The second part of this article will focus more in-depth on the 
claim of clergy malpractice as a basis for a suit.  The third part of this article will focus on the 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty.  The fourth part of the part will contain my analysis of these 
claims and the decisions of courts that have dealt with clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary 
duty.   
 
The First Amendment’s Bar to Tort Actions Against the Clergy and Church Entities 
 Any tort action against a clergy member or church entity will inevitably implicate the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Although the First Amendment will act as a 
bar to adjudication in many cases, it is not always a bar, and should not be read as barring every 
tort suit against clergy members or church entities.  Before moving into the specific tort claims 
of clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, it is important to first generally discuss the 
First Amendment implications of suits against clergy and church entities.  
                                                 
5 Doe v. Evans, 2002 WL 389877 (Fla. 2002) 
6 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By the 
Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP L. REV. 743, 744 (1998). 
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 A consequence of this Nation’s fundamental belief in the separation of church and state is 
that, under most circumstances, the First and Fourteenth Amendments preclude civil courts from 
adjudicating church fights that require extensive inquiry into matters of ecclesiastical 
cognizance.7  “The First Amendment language that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…’ historically has stood for the 
strict prohibition of governmental interference in ecclesiastical matters.”8  “A ‘spirit of freedom 
for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation in short, power 
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine’ is reflected in the Supreme Court’s decisions.”9   
“Only on rare occasions where there exists a compelling government interest in 
regulation of public, health, safety, and general welfare will courts venture into ecclesiastical 
matters.”10  “Such incursions have been cautiously made so as not to interfere with the doctrinal 
beliefs and internal decisions of the religious society.”11  Courts may not decide issues involving 
religious doctrine, belief, discipline, faith or custom.12  “[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects 
religious relationships, including the counseling relationship between a minister and his or her 
parishioner, primarily by preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes turning on 
matters of religious doctrine or practice.”13  “Thus the law is clear: civil courts are barred by the 
First Amendment from determining ecclesiastical questions.”14    
                                                 
7 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-11 (1976). 
8 Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974) citing to U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
9 Id. quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 493. 
12 Shea Sisk Wellford, Tort Actions Against Churches—What Protections Does the First Amendment Provide?, 25 
U. MEM. L. REV. 193, 196 (1994). 
13 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998). 
14 Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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However, the First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships 
from judicial scrutiny.15  Courts have repeatedly stressed the well-established principle that, 
although there is an absolute freedom to believe, the freedom to act upon those religious beliefs 
is limited, and needs to be limited for the protection of the public.16  Conduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society.17  This government regulation can include both statutory 
law and court action through civil lawsuits.18   
The First Amendment has not been interpreted to mean that “when otherwise prohibitable 
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself 
must be free from government regulation.19  Nor has it “been applied so as to confer a right to 
anyone to threaten the public safety, regardless of any religious motivation.”20  The First 
Amendment does not “shield clerical misconduct from criminal prosecution, nor has it been 
invoked to shield clerical misconduct from liability for intentional tortuous conduct.”21  If it is 
demonstrated that the conduct at issue was rooted in religious beliefs, then the court must 
determine whether the law regulating the conduct is neutral both on its face and in its purpose.22  
The regulation is proper if the court applies neutral principles of law to regulate the conduct. 
“The United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue of whether the First 
Amendment protects a religious institution from liability when a church employee engages in 
tortuous conduct against a third-party, whether it arises from sexual assault and battery of a 
                                                 
15 Sanders, 134 F.2d at 335 (5th Cir. 1998). 
16 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By the 
Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 744 (1998). 
17 Zanita E. Fenton, ARTICLE: Faith in Justice, Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 45, 70. 
18 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, page 6 
19 Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 
20 Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of New York, 271 A.D.2d 494, 500; 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2000) citing to 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-90. 
21 Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of New York, 271 A.D.2d 494, 500; 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2000). 
22 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 
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minor or an adult…or whether it arises in the context of adult counseling.”23  “Substantial 
authority in both state and federal courts concludes that the right to religious freedom and 
autonomy protected by the First Amendment is not violated by permitting the courts to 
adjudicate tort liability against a religious institution based on a claim that a clergy member 
engaged in tortuous conduct such as sexual assault and battery in the course of his or her 
relationship with a parishioner.”24  “These courts conclude that there is no impermissible 
interpretation of religious doctrine because the courts are applying a neutral principal of 
generally applicable tort law.”25  “Moreover, it has been asserted that a contrary holding actually 
places a church or its clergy in a preferred position of being immune from tort liability solely 
because of religion, which in itself would have the impermissible effect of recognizing a religion 
in violation of the Establishment Clause.”26 
 “On the other hand, there is contrary authority from some states and federal courts that 
concludes that any tort claim against a religious institution founded on negligent hiring or 
supervision or breach of fiduciary duty is barred because the adjudication of the tort dispute 
would necessarily involve an examination of the religious institution’s method of hiring, 
supervising, and disciplining its clergy, thus interfering with its religious autonomy.”27  These 
courts reason that the evaluation of these claims would impermissibly interfere with the right of 
the church to determine standards governing the relationship between the church and it clergy.28 
 Therefore, while the First Amendment is an impediment to courts freely adjudicating 
civil matters involving church entities and their clergy, it is not a bar in all cases.  Generally, 
                                                 
23 Id. at 357. 
24 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 358 (Fla. 2002). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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courts may not interpret church laws, policies or practices in a manner that will limit the church’s 
ability to fully practice its religion or be guided by its religious principles.29  However, this does 
not prevent courts from addressing church-related disputes, provided the court refrains from 
considering doctrinal matter and resolves the dispute solely on neutral principles.30  For the 
protection of society it is important that courts be given some leeway in deciding civil matters 
involving churches and their clergy. 
 
Clergy Malpractice 
   Clergy malpractice is a cause of action routinely raised in civil actions against churches 
and their clergy.  Clergy malpractice first received measurable scholarly attention with the case 
of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,31 where the cause of action initially 
appeared.32  In Nally, the parents of a twenty-four-year-old man brought a wrongful death action 
against Grace Community Church of the Valley after their son, Kenneth Nally, committed 
suicide.33 
 Kenneth Nally, a member of Grace Community Church of the Valley, had participated in 
the Defendants’ pastoral counseling programs prior to his death.34  The Defendants held 
themselves out as “pastoral counselors able to deal with a variety of problems—not as 
professional, medical or psychiatric counselors.”35   
                                                 
29 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
30 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1989). 
31 Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 763 P.2d 948 (1988). 
32 Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice, Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
45, 47 (2001). 
33 Id. at 47-48. 
34 Nally, 47 Cal.3d at 283. 
35 Id. 
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On March 11, 1978, Nally first attempted to take his life.36  After this first suicide 
attempt, Pastors MacArthur and Rea, from Grace Community Church of the Valley, visited Nally 
at the hospital.37  At the hospital, Nally “separately told both pastors that he was sorry he did not 
succeed in committing suicide.”38  Neither of the Pastors informed the hospital staff of Nally’s 
“death wish.”39 
 Eleven days before successfully committing suicide, Nally met with Pastor Thomson, 
another Pastor from the Church, for spiritual counseling.40  During that counseling session, Nally 
asked Pastor Thomson “whether Christians who commit suicide would nonetheless be saved.”41  
Thomson told Nally that “a person who is once saved is always saved”, but that “it would be 
wrong to be thinking in such terms.”42 
 The Plaintiffs, Nally’s parents, based their wrongful death action on clergy malpractice.43   
They alleged that Defendants’ conduct in counseling Nally was outrageous because “they taught 
or otherwise imbued Nally, whom they knew to be depressed and having entertained suicidal 
thoughts, with the notion that if he had accepted Jesus Christ as his personal savior, he would 
still be accepted to heaven if he committed suicide.”44  Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that 
Nally’s statements to Pastors Rea and MacArthur, were “hidden dangers, ” and that the Pastors 
should have warned the hospital staff that Nally was contemplating another suicide attempt.45 
 The California Supreme Court held that a duty should not be imposed on clergy when 
engaging in spiritual counseling, stating that “the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the 
                                                 
36 Id. at 285. 
37 Id. at 286. 
38 Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 286, 763 P.2d 948 (1988). 
39 Id. at 286. 
40 Id. at 286. 
41 Id. at 286. 
42 Id. at 286. 
43 Id. at 287. 
44 Id. at 288. 
45 Id. at 296. 
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competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious organizations.”46  
The Court went on to state that: 
Because of the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our 
state and practiced by the church members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite 
possibly unconstitutional to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors.  Such a duty 
would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of a particular 
denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.47   
      
Following Nally, no American Court has allowed a claim for clergy malpractice to go 
forward.48  These Courts state that a claim of clergy malpractice would require a determination 
of the duties owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner.49  Allowing a claim for clergy 
malpractice would cause courts to attempt to define the duty of care owed by a clergy member to 
a parishioner and would foster an excessive entanglement with religion.  “Because the judiciary 
must abstain from ecclesiastical disputes involving questions of doctrine or practice, state courts 
have rejected uniformly claims for clergy malpractice”50   
 As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in F.G. v. MacDonell,51 Clergy malpractice 
is not an appropriate form of relief to recover against clergy members for sexual misconduct 
occurring when a clergy member is providing counseling to a parishioner, since such a claim 
requires the definition of a relevant standard of care as a matter of particular church beliefs and 
practices, which would restrain the free exercise of religion.52  Defining such standards forces the 
court to investigate and review the skill, training, and standards required of clergy members in 
                                                 
46 Id. at 298. 
47 Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 299, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). 
48 Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 271 A.D.2d 494; 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (2000) 
49 Id. at 662. 
50 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998). 
51 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997). 
52 Id. 
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different religions, denominations, and sects.53  Undertaking such a task causes courts to become 
heavily entangled in religious doctrine and practice.54 
 When defined as a requirement to exercise the skill and knowledge of members of the 
profession, an action for clergy malpractice is incompatible with the separation of church and 
state.55  “Thus, as [numerous courts] have correctly concluded, to recognize a claim for clergy 
malpractice would require courts to identify and apply the teachings of a particular faith, thereby 
making the judiciary responsible for determining what conduct and beliefs are part of a particular 
religion.”56  “It would be impossible for a court or jury to adjudicate a typical case of clergy 
malpractice, without first ascertaining whether the cleric…performed within the level of 
expertise expected of a similar professional following his calling, or practicing his profession 
within the community.”57 
 Many Courts have used this same reasoning to bar claims of breach of fiduciary duty as 
well.  While some courts have found that a claim for clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary 
duty are separate and distinct claims, allowing plaintiffs to recover for breach of fiduciary duty, 
other courts have found that the two claims are indistinguishable and have not allowed recovery 
for either claim.58   
 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Paul A. Clark, Clergy Malpractice After F.G. v. MacDonell and Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 22 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 229, 231 (1998). 
55 Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice, Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
45, 55 (2001). 
56 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998). 
57 Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327 (N.Y.S.2d 1991). 
58 See Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Mich Ct. App. 1999), the court held that 
the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a pastor for engaging in a sexual relationship with parishioner during 
the course of a pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice claim.  See also Schmidt v. 
Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court held that the First Amendment barred a child’s breach 
of fiduciary duty claim against pastor. 
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Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
 In contrast to clergy malpractice, several parishioners have brought successful claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty.59  The theory underlying this claim is that the clergy-parishioner 
counseling relationship, while not a professional relationship, places the clergy member in the 
position of fiduciary and imposes a duty upon him to refrain from inappropriate behavior.60 
 A fiduciary is defined as “a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act 
primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with the undertaking.”61  For a fiduciary 
relationship to exist, there must be an “interaction that creates trust and reliance,” allowing one 
party to occupy a superior position to another.62  Inherent in this definition is an imbalance of 
power between the parties.63  It is said that the relationship exists in all cases in which influence 
has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.64  The pattern 
that emerges is one where courts will extend the protection of fiduciary law to relationships 
whenever their prime characteristic is that “the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the 
person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a 
superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party.”65    
“Historically, fiduciary relationships include: trustee to beneficiary; guardian to ward; 
attorney to client; executor to legatees or beneficiaries; partner to partner; corporate directors or 
officers to the corporation; majority shareholders to other shareholders; and bailor to bailee.  
                                                 
59 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By the 
Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 744. 
60 Id. at 744. 
61 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By the 
Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 751 citing to Destafano v. Grabrian, 
763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). 
62 Id. at 753. 
63 Id. at 762. 
64 Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice, Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
45, 62 (2001). 
65 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1996). 
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Some courts have found fiduciary relationships between physicians and their patients, social 
workers and their charges; and between ministers and parishioners.66   
Although cases that have allowed breach of fiduciary duty claims in relationships 
between parishioners and churches or their clergyman, clearly have no historical basis in the law 
of agency, and there is no professional relationship that typically exists between these parties,67 
some courts have been willing to find a fiduciary relationship.  While the clergy-parishioner 
relationship is not, per se, fiduciary, the interaction that occurs between these parties creates trust 
and reliance, establishing the basis for a confidential relationship that can become fiduciary in 
nature.68  As with any breach of fiduciary duty claim, in the pastoral counselor context, a 
parishioner must show the existence of a fiduciary relationship, an attendant fiduciary duty, and 
that the duty was breached.69   
 Some State and Federal Courts have rejected both the fiduciary duty theory and the 
clergy malpractice theory as a means of recovery for counselees injured by the sexual 
misconduct of their clergy.70  Other courts have denied clergy malpractice claims, but allowed 
claims based on breach of fiduciary duty, reasoning that a breach of fiduciary duty involves a 
betrayal of trust and does not require a professional relationship or a professional standard of 
care—two criteria of a clergy malpractice action cited by courts as reasons for denial of clergy 
malpractice causes of action.71  Courts allowing fiduciary duty actions to proceed find that the 
combination of the position of trust held by the clergy, exacerbated by the counseling 
                                                 
66 Id. at 40.  
67 7 Colo. Prac., Personal Injury Torts and Insurance § 25.14 (2d ed.). 
68 Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). 
69 7 Colo. Prac., Personal Injury Torts and Insurance § 25.14 (2d ed.). 
70 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1996). 
71 Id. 
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relationship, meant that the clergy, who were in a superior position to the counselees, assumed a 
duty to act in good faith, and then breached that duty.72 
In Dausch v. Rykse,73 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim against a clergy member.  Linda Dausch, a member of the congregation of the Knox 
Presbyterian Church, sought counseling from her church’s pastor, Reverend Greg Rykse.74  
Dausch alleged in her complaint that the church and the Reverend had a duty to provide 
psychological counseling to members of the congregation, which would include Dausch.75  
However, according to Dausch’s complaint, Rykse “engaged in dangerous and improper 
counseling relations with Plaintiff, which included engaging in sexual contact during the course 
of psychotherapy with Plaintiff, an emotionally dependent patient.”76   
Dausch claimed that the counseling relationship between herself and Rykse started after a 
coordinator at the Church had called her to inquire why she was not attending church and 
recommended that she seek counseling from Rykse.77  Dausch further claimed that Rykse had 
told her that she needed secular counseling, not religious, and that he could provide that for her, 
and that it was included in his job description at the church.78  Dausch attended counseling 
sessions with Rykse from January 1988 until May 1990.79  Dausch claimed that during her 
counseling sessions, Rykse had stated that “religion does not apply here.”80  “[O]n June 14, 
1998, Rykse allegedly gave Dausch an ultimatum: “I have been giving to you, and I need 
something back for my services.  You must give back to me or I will not work with you 
                                                 
72 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1996). 
73 Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994). 
74 Id. at 1427 (7th Cir. 1994). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1428. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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anymore.”81 “ From that point until the end of Dausch’s counseling sessions with Rykse, the 
therapy sessions began with sexual relations [between Dausch and] Rykse.”82 
In answering Dausch’s claim of professional negligence, the Court of Appeals found that 
the District Court’s holding that the claim for professional malpractice should not be allowed 
was correct, because it was actually a claim for clergy malpractice which was not a recognized 
cause of action in the state of Illinois.83  Additionally, the court stated that “the allegation of 
fiduciary duty was simply an elliptical way to state a clergy malpractice claim, a cause of action 
that it had already held to be not recognized in Illinois.”84 
In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 85 the Fifth Circuit permitted a claim for breach 
of fiduciary against a church and its minister.86  In Sanders, Robyn Sanders and Lisa Mullanix, 
brought suit against their employer, Casa View Baptist Church (CVBC), and one of it ministers 
Shelby Baucum.87  The claims against Baucum were that he had committed malpractice and 
breached his fiduciary duties as a marriage counselor by, “among other things, encouraging and 
consummating a sexual relationship with each plaintiff.”88 
“In 1998, CVBC hired Baucum to be its Minister of Education and Administration 
(MEA).89  As the MEA, Baucum understood that his duties did not include counseling and that 
he was not part of spiritual counseling staff that the church provided to its members.90 
Regardless of this knowledge, in December 1990, Baucum began providing marriage counseling 
to Mullanix, a member of CVBC.91  In February 1991, CVBC hired Sanders as a secretary for 
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1429. 
85 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 333. 
88 Id. at 334. 
89 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1998). 
90 Id. at 334. 
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Baucum and she also began seeing him for marital counseling.92  Baucum had represented to 
both of these women that “he was qualified by education and experience to provide marital 
counseling.”93  They both believed that he was authorized by the church to provide marital 
counseling.94  The jury found that through these actions, Baucum had “entered into fiduciary 
relationships with the Plaintiffs because he acquired influence and gained their trust and 
confidence during the course of these separate counseling relationships.”95 
“At trial the Plaintiffs presented evidence that Baucum had breached his duties as a 
marriage counselor, not only by expressing love and affection for each of them and encouraging 
them both to express these feelings for him, but also by engaging in sexual intercourse with each 
of them on numerous occasions.”96  “They also presented evidence that Baucum breached his 
fiduciary duties…by disclosing their confidences, including intimate details of their marriages 
and sexual histories.”97   
“Although Baucum testified that he sometimes discussed scripture in his counseling 
sessions with Mullanix and Sanders, the jury found that the counseling he provided was 
“essentially secular” in nature.”98  In appealing the jury’s decision, Baucum argued that the First 
Amendment precluded judicial review of certain ecclesiastical disputes, and that “his secular 
misconduct as the plaintiffs’ counselor was not actionable because it occurred within two 
inherently ecclesiastical, rather than purely secular counseling relationships.99  He also argued 
                                                                                                                                                             
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1998). 
99 Id. at 335. 
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that he should be entitled to judgment because the plaintiffs’ claims “were in essence 
noncognizable claims of clergy malpractice.”100 
In disagreeing with Baucum’s assertions in his appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that 
“[t]he First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships from judicial 
scrutiny, for to do so would necessarily extend constitutional protection to the secular 
components of these relationships.”101  They stated that “Baucum’s contention that the Free 
Exercise Clause prohibits the judiciary from reviewing the conduct of those involved in 
relationships that are not purely secular in nature might, if adopted, foster the development of 
some important spiritual relationships by eliminating the possibility of civil or criminal liability 
for participating members of the clergy, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot 
be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an 
otherwise religious relationship between a minister and a member of his or her congregation. To 
hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a preferred position in 
society.”102 
The Court of Appeals continued by stating “that the First Amendment’s respect for 
religious relationships does not require a minister’s counseling relationship with a parishioner to 
be purely secular in order for a court to review the propriety of the conduct occurring within that 
relationship.”103  “Instead, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious relationships, including the 
counseling relationship between a minister and his or her parishioner, primarily by preventing 
the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes turning on matters of religious doctrine or 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 335-36. 
102 Id. at 336. 
103 Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1998).  The statement was a response by the 
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practice.”104  The Court said that First Amendment difficulties posed by a clergy malpractice 
claim were not present because in this case the plaintiffs’ claims were for malpractice by a 
marriage counselor and breach of fiduciary duties were not derived from religious doctrine.105 
The Court stated that their decision was consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s Dausch 
decision because the jury in Sanders had been instructed that the primary relationship between a 
minister and a parishioner is not a fiduciary one, and that Baucum could not be held liable for 
breaching his fiduciary duties unless he acquired and abused influence and betrayed confidences 
learned in a relationship of trust.106  The jury found that “Baucum held himself out as possessing 
the education and experience of a professional marriage counselor, his counseling activities with 
the plaintiffs were judged, not by a standard of care defined by religious teachings, but by a 
professional standard of care developed through expert testimony describing what a reasonably 
prudent counselor would have done under the same or similar circumstances.”107  In contrast, in 
Dausch the Plaintiff asserted that her pastor was her fiduciary, not because of his conduct as her 
counselor, but simply because of her status as a member of the congregation seeking counseling 
and his status as her pastor and counselor.108  The Court concluded that for Defendant Baucum to 
invoke the protection of the First Amendment, he would have had to assert that the specific 
conduct allegedly constituting a breach of his professional and fiduciary duties was rooted in 
religious belief.109 
In Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,110 the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment holding a Bishop and Episcopal Diocese directly liable for a breach of fiduciary 
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duty.  The Moses decision arose out of a suit by Mary Moses Tenantry (Tenantry) against the 
Episcopal Diocese of Colorado and Bishop William Frey for breach of fiduciary duties.111  
Tenantry, who had been a parishioner at two Episcopal Churches in Denver, sought counseling 
from Father Paul Robinson who was an assistant priest at one of the churches where Tenantry 
was a parishioner.112  Tenantry had sought counseling from Father Robinson to discuss her fear 
that she was responsible for the cerebral palsy that afflicted her youngest child.113  Prior to 
entering into the counseling with Father Robinson, Tenantry had a long history of mental 
illness.114  “While counseling and advising Tenantry, Father Robinson entered into a sexual 
relationship with her that included multiple acts of both fellatio and cunnilingus.”115  When 
Tenantry’s relationship with Father Robinson ended, she suffered a relapse and aggravation of 
her mental illness.116   
After finding out about the affair between Tenantry and Robinson, Tenantry’s husband 
met with Bishop Frey, Father Robinson’s superior, to discuss the affair and to ask the Bishop to 
take care of the matter.117  Tenantry met with the Bishop after her husband.118  At the meeting, 
Tenantry described her past to Bishop Frey and explained that she had an intimate relationship 
with Father Robinson.119  Tenantry discussed her fear of not having salvation because of her acts 
and Bishop Frey granted her absolution.120  Bishop Frey told her not to talk about the 
relationship with anyone except her husband.121  Later, Tenantry had a chance meeting with 
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Father Robinson at a local hospital.  After that meeting, her marriage ended in divorce and her 
mental health deteriorated.122  The jury found that Bishop Frey and the Diocese breached their 
fiduciary duties to the Tenantry.123 
 The Colorado Supreme Court stated that a decision in this case would not require a 
reading of the Constitution and Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church or any other 
documents of church governance.124  The Court went on to say that “[b]ecause the facts of this 
case do not require interpreting or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles of law can be 
applied, the First Amendment is not a defense against Tenantry’s claims.125    
The Defendants in Moses attempted to get the Colorado Supreme Court to overrule prior 
Colorado law and find that breach of fiduciary duty was akin to clergy malpractice.126  However, 
the Court stated that breach of fiduciary duty and clergy malpractice are not identical claims and 
involve different elements.127  The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to allow 
the jury to find that a fiduciary duty existed between Bishop Frey the Diocese and Tenantry and 
that the breach of the fiduciary duty caused Tenantry’s injuries.128 
In F.G. v. MacDonell,129 the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed a claim for of breach 
of fiduciary duty against a clergy member.  That Court held that a claim of breach of a fiduciary 
duty could be maintained against a cleric for sexual misconduct during the course of counseling 
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a parishioner.130  In so holding, the court reasoned that the First Amendment protection does not 
extend to the inappropriate actions of clergymen entrusted with the counseling of parishioners.131   
The Plaintiff, F.G., was a parishioner at All Saints Episcopal Church in Bergenfield, New 
Jersey.132  F.G. sought counseling from Defendant, Reverend Alex MacDonnell, the rector at All 
Saints Episcopal Church.133  F.G. alleged that during the course of these counseling sessions, 
Reverend MacDonnell preyed upon her vulnerability and seduced her into a sexual 
relationship.134 
F.G. sought recovery against MacDonnell for breach of fiduciary duty.135  In concluding 
that F.G. could recover on her breach of fiduciary duty claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
stated that “[a]n action for breach of a clergyman’s fiduciary duty permits the parishioner to 
recover monetary damages without running the risk of entanglement with the free exercise of 
religion.”136  The Court went on to state that “[u]nlike an action for clergy malpractice, an action 
for breach of fiduciary duty does not require establishing a standard of care and its breach.”137  
“Establishing a fiduciary duty essentially requires proof that a parishioner trusted and sought 
counseling from the pastor.”138  “A violation of that trust constitutes a breach of the duty.”139 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon has also found that the First Amendment does not act as 
a shield to liability for breach of fiduciary duty in Erickson v. Christenson.140  In Erickson, a 
pastor established a relationship with one of his parishioners in 1970 when she was thirteen years 
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old.  According to Erickson, her pastor, Christenson, had coerced and manipulated her to have 
sexual relations with him.141 
 The Court in Erickson briefly discussed Christenson’s argument that Erickson’s breach of 
fiduciary duty claim was actually a claim for clergy malpractice.  The court noted that a claim for 
breach of fiduciary relationship is different from a claim of clergy malpractice.142  Second, 
because Erickson’s claims were not premised on Christenson’s position as a pastor, but rather on 
the relationship of trust and confidence that developed during counseling, the court allowed 
Erickson’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.143 
 Another Oregon case, C.B. v. Grammond,144 a case brought in the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, found that an action for breach of fiduciary duty could be 
maintained.  The Plaintiff, designated as CB, was a parishioner of the defendants, the 
Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon.145  CB alleged through his complaint that Maurice 
Grammond, a Roman Catholic priest who was employed by the Archdiocese of Portland in 
Oregon, sexually abused him during the period of time that he served as an alter boy.146  One of 
the claims brought by CB was for breach of fiduciary duty.147  The suit was originally brought in 
State court and removed to the Federal District Court.148 
The District Court quickly disposed of the argument that the First Amendment should bar 
the breach of fiduciary duty claim by stating that the court had “already discussed a claim for 
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breach of fiduciary duty and found that such a claim does not implicate First Amendment 
rights.”149 
A recent Florida Supreme Court decision allowed a breach of fiduciary duty suit in a case 
dealing with marital counseling by a clergyman.150  In Doe v. Evans, Jane Doe brought a suit 
against William Dunbar Evans III, the Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc., the Diocese of 
Southeast Florida, Inc., and Calvin O. Schofield, Jr., a bishop at the Diocese.  The claim arose 
out of a marital counseling relationship between Doe and Evans that lasted for several months.   
Doe’s Complaint asserted that part of Evans’ duties as pastor included providing 
counseling and spiritual advice to parishioners having marital difficulties.151  The Complaint was 
premised on the fact that during the course of this marital counseling, Evans instituted a personal 
relationship and became involved with Doe in a romantic manner.152  Doe claimed that none of 
the defendants’ conduct was motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs.153  She alleged that the 
Defendants assumed a fiduciary duty to her by directly soliciting her trust and confidence.  Evans 
then breached that duty by becoming romantically involved with her and by failing to adequately 
keep Doe’s interests paramount, and the Church Defendants allegedly breached their duty 
because they were aware early on in the counseling process that Evans was abusing his position 
of trust and failed to protect Doe.154   
 In Doe, the Florida Supreme Court stated that “a fiduciary relationship exists between 
two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of 
another upon matters within the scope of that relation.”155  The Court also stated that “one 
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standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting 
from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.”156  The Court went on to “hold that when a 
church, through its clergy, holds itself out as qualified to engage in marital counseling and a 
counseling relationship arises, that relationship between the church and the counselee is one that 
may be characterized as fiduciary in nature.”157   
 The Doe Court stated that they agreed with the reasoning of courts that have determined 
that the evaluation of whether a fiduciary relationship arose and whether a religious organization 
breached this duty does not require an adjudication of religious doctrine or beliefs.158  The Court 
stated that “allowing Doe’s claim to be adjudicated in a secular court neither infringes upon nor 
restricts the religious practices of the Church Defendants and thus does not constitute a Free 
Exercise Clause violation.”159  The Court continued stating that “Doe’s breach of fiduciary duty 
claim is governed by neutral law principles of general application.”160 
 Generally the cases that have rejected the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty 
have chose not to distinguish between the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and that 
for clergy malpractice; furthermore, those courts have determined that either cause of action 
would impermissibly entangle courts in religious matters.161 
 In Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha162 the Supreme Court of Nebraska held 
that the First Amendment barred an adult parishioner who engaged in a sexual relationship with 
a priest during the course of pastoral counseling from bringing a breach of fiduciary duty 
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claim.163  In 1979, Schieffer began seeing Lange for counseling regarding family matters.164  
Lange was Schieffer’s parish priest and “spiritual leader.”165  During the course of pastoral 
counseling, “Lange made sexual advances toward [Schieffer] that continued for a period of 3 
years.”166  In 1982, Lange and Schieffer began a sexual relationship that continued 
approximately seven years.167  At all relevant times, Lange was an employee of the 
Archdiocese.168  One of the claims brought by the Plaintiff was for breach of fiduciary duty.169 
 Schieffer alleged that Lange had a fiduciary obligation to her to refrain from doing 
anything that might harm her relationship with her husband and children, “in light of Lange’s 
continuing duty to exercise reasonable care.”170  In Schieffer, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
decided to follow the reasoning in Schmidt v. Bishop, in finding that a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty was similar to a claim for clergy malpractice and would create many constitutional 
difficulties with regard to defining a standard of care.171  
 Schmidt v. Bishop172 is a case from the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.  When Schmidt was twelve years old she began receiving counseling from Reverend 
Joseph Bishop.  Shortly after the counseling relationship began, Schmidt and Bishop entered into 
a sexual relationship.  To justify his conduct, Bishop told Schmidt that “the relationship was 
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special and acceptable in the eyes of the lord.”  This relationship continued until Schmidt was 
forty years old.173 
 The District Court began by examining the nature of fiduciary relationship.  In 
reconciling the potentially broad nature of the relationship, the court reasoned that, although “it 
is clear that not every confidential relationship…involves…a “fiduciary relationship;” the 
concept of fiduciary also comprehends informal relations.”174  The court subsequently reasoned 
that a fiduciary duty claim was essentially an allegation of “clergy malpractice.”175  The court 
concluded that defining or articulating the scope of the duty owed by clergy, under either a 
clergy malpractice claim or breach of fiduciary duty claim, raises constitutional difficulties that a 
court may not address.176 
In Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod,177 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a pastor for a sexual relationship with a parishioner 
during the course of pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice.  
Teadt raised a question of first impression in Michigan regarding whether to recognize a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty against a member of the clergy who engaged in a sexual 
relationship with a parishioner.178   
The case arose out a relationship between Linda Teadt and Robert Garbisch that lasted 
from late 1989 until the fall of 1994.179  Garbisch was the pastor of the defendant St. John’s 
church during the period of the relationship.180  Teadt’s relationship with Garbisch began when 
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he visited her at home before surgery on her lower back.181  Garbisch assumed the role of 
pastoral counselor and attempted to help Teadt with several personal difficulties that she 
faced.182  At some later point, Teadt and Garbisch engaged in a sexual relationship.183  Garbisch 
claimed that the sexual relationship was consensual, however, Teadt claimed that “Garbisch 
began making sexual advances toward her and that when she protested, he misled her with his 
distorted views of Christian morality, which confused [her] because of Garbisch’s superior status 
as pastor of her church.”184 
 Although a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty had not been recognized in 
Michigan in the context of a counseling relationship between a clergyman and a parishioner, 
Teadt argued that Michigan should adopt the reasoning of F.G. v. MacDonell.185  However, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that “[Teadt’s] allegations that Garbisch misused his 
superior position as her pastor and counselor in order to achieve a sexual relationship with her 
[revealed] that the gist of [her] action [was] in fact clergy malpractice.”186  The Court went on to 
say a claim for clergy malpractice is not recognized in Michigan, as it has not been recognized 
by any United States Court.187 
 Although, Teadt urged the Michigan Court of Appeals to follow jurisdictions that have 
made a distinction between breach of fiduciary duty and clergy malpractice and find that a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty should be allowed, the Court chose to follow the reasoning in 
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Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, and decided not to recognize a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.188   
 In Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,189 the Supreme Court of New York, 
Kings County held that a parishioner could not maintain a civil action against a priest for breach 
of fiduciary duty, occurring when the priest allegedly seduced her.190  On Appeal, the Supreme 
Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.191 
 Langford, arose out of a suit by a parishioner (Susan Langford) against Monsignor 
Nicholas Sivillo.192  “The relationship between Sivillo and [Langford] commenced in 1989 
when, after being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, [Langford] looked to God for direction.”193  
“Feeling fearful, hopeless, and suicidal, Langford turned to her parish church, the Defendant Our 
Lady of Hope, for direction and counseling regarding the effects of her disease.”194  “In February 
1989 she first spoke with the Defendant, Monsignor Nicholas Sivillo.”195  After that point, 
Sivillo visited Langford’s home where he counseled her and “consoled her with assurances that 
he would beseech the Lord to fill her with peace.”196  “When [Langford’s] condition went into 
remission, [she] believed that it was due to Sivillo’s prayers.”197  “While the relationship 
between Sivillo and [Langford] initially involved spiritual counseling, it later evolved to include 
a sexual component.”198  “Convinced that Sivillo was indeed her lifeline without whose 
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counseling her physical condition would certainly regress, Langford succumbed to his advances 
and began to have sexual intercourse with him.”199  In 1992, Langford began to see a secular 
therapist who eventually determined that Sivillo had manipulated and used her.200 
 The court in Langford stated that “[t]he cause of action alleging that Sivillo negligently 
handled the counseling relationship in fact stated a claim for malpractice.”201  “As such, it was 
properly dismissed because any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the 
clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion.”202   
The court went on to say that “the cause of action labeled one to recover damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty, was clearly that Sivillo was guilty of clergy malpractice.”203  They said 
that since Langford had sought religious and spiritual counseling from Sivillo, “any breach of 
Sivillo’s fiduciary duties can only be construed as clergy malpractice, since it would clearly 
require a determination concerning Sivillo’s duties as a member of the clergy offering religious 
counseling to [Langford].”204  The court concluded that any “recognition of a cause of action to 
recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty…would require the courts to “venture into 
forbidden ecclesiastical terrain.’”205        
 In Langford, Judge Miller, concurring in part and dissenting in part with the Majority’s 
decision asserted that the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty should be allowed.206  
Judge Miller stated “while a claim of clergy malpractice may require a court to examine 
ecclesiastical doctrine, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty raises secular issues, which can be 
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adjudicated using neutral principals of law.”207  “Using neutral principles of law, premised upon 
neutral facts, a court can allow a jury to determine that Sivillo acquired influence over Langford 
by virtue of his role as an established religious leader, that he abused his influence and her trust 
by demanding a sexual relationship while warning her that only he prevented her physical 
condition from severely deteriorating.”208  “These findings would require no inquiry into the 
doctrine of the Catholic Church and would thus not violate the First Amendment.”209  “It has not 
been, and cannot be claimed that a religious entity is immunized by the First Amendment from 
liability resulting from tortuous conduct.”210  Judge Miller concluded by stating that “[t]he 
hallmark of fiduciary duty—an imbalance of power between the parties, is especially manifest in 
the relationship between priest and parishioner.”211   
In H.R.B v. J.L.G.,212 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment 
barred a child victim of sexual abuse by a priest from bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
against the priest, church official, and church.  Plaintiff, H.R.B., and his wife, filed a suit alleging 
that when the plaintiff was a thirteen-year-old student at a school run by the Catholic Church, he 
suffered various instances of sexual abuse by defendant J.L.G., a Roman Catholic priest 
employed by the church.213  Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant “gained the trust and confidence 
of the Plaintiff by holding himself out as a teacher, counselor and qualified parish priest and 
alleged his actions constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties.”214   
The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that “Missouri Courts have not addressed whether 
clergy and religious organizations can be held civilly liable in actions for breach of fiduciary 
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duty with respect to sexual misconduct of clergy.”215  The Court went on to say that “[our] 
review of the law in other jurisdictions compels us to conclude such actions should not be 
recognized, as they will inevitably entangle civil courts in religious matters.”216 
The Court continued its opinion by discussing the cases that have recognized the breach 
of fiduciary duty claim,217 stating that “[t]hese cases reasoned that if the tortuous behavior of the 
cleric was not religiously motivated, could be evaluated by means of “neutral principles” 
applicable to clergy and lay persons alike, and did not require inquiry into the tenets and beliefs 
of the particular cleric’s faith, the First Amendment was not a defense to such actions.”218  The 
Court then discussed the cases that have rejected the cause of action,219 stating that “[i]n those 
cases, the courts held that analyzing and defining the scope of fiduciary duty owed persons by 
their clergy (assuming pastoral relationships were “fiduciary”) would require courts to define and 
express the standard of care followed by reasonable clergy of the particular faith involved, which 
in turn would require the Court and the jury to consider the fundamental perspective and 
approach to counseling inherent in the beliefs and practices of that denomination, [t]his is as 
unconstitutional as it is impossible [because] it fosters excessive entanglement with religion.”220 
The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that it was aligning itself with the jurisdictions 
that have refused to recognize breach of fiduciary duty actions against clergy for sexual 
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misconduct.221  The Court stated that there are other causes of action available to the plaintiff 
“which do not require the trial court to determine whether the defendant breached his trusted and 
confidential relationship with the plaintiff…[and that] religion was not merely incidental to 
plaintiff’s relationship with defendant…it was the foundation of it.”222  
 In Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church,223 the Texas Court of Appeals declined to 
recognize a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a pastor for sexual relationship with an adult 
parishioner during the course of marital counseling because of concerns towards treading upon 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
 Hawkins arose out of suit by Mark and Larinda Hawkins against Trinity Baptist Church 
and Reverend Darrell Wait.224  In June 1996 Larinda, a longtime member of Trinity, was hired 
by Trinity as the church secretary.225  In January 1997, she began visiting with Wait, the pastor at 
Trinity, about marital problems she was having with her husband, Mark.226  These meetings grew 
into regular sessions that took place three times per week.227   
At the end of April or early 1997, Wait invited Larinda to come to his private residence 
while his wife was out of town.228  “At this meeting, Wait told Larinda he did not understand the 
act of oral sex she had described performing on her husband, Mark.  He asked her to perform it 
on him so he would understand.”229  Larinda told Wait that “she did not like performing this act 
but acceded to Wait’s request and performed it on him.”230   
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Later in May, during a counseling session with Wait, Mark admitted that he had an 
affair.231  The next day Wait informed Larinda of Mark’s admission; she then confronted Mark 
with this information and moved out of their marital home.232  After that, Wait and Larinda had 
sexual intercourse on two occasions.233  Finally, Mark informed another minister at the church 
about the inappropriate sexual relationship between Larinda and Wait, after which Wait resigned 
from his position as pastor of Trinity.234     
Larinda and Mark filed suit against Wait and Trinity alleging among other things, breach 
of fiduciary relationship on the part of Wait.235  The Texas Court of Appeals stated that Mark and 
Larinda had “failed to cite any Texas authority establishing that Texas recognizes a fiduciary 
relationship between a pastor and [church] member.”236  The Court cited Judge Ripple’s opinion 
in Dausch v. Rykes237 as support for its holding that Texas should not recognize a cause of action 
for breach of fiduciary duty, the Court said that “[t]he judge aptly explained the concern invoked 
by the creation of such a cause of action as follows: 
If the court were to recognize such a breach of fiduciary duty, it would be 
required to define a reasonable duty standard and to evaluate Rykse’s [the 
pastor’s] conduct against that standard, an inquiry identical to that which Illinois 
has declined to undertake in the context of a clergy malpractice claim and one that 
is of doubtful validity under the Free Exercise Clause.238 
 
The Court concluded by stating that “[l]ike Illinois, Texas recognizes no cause of action 
for clergy malpractice.”239  “Given our concerns toward treading upon the Free Exercise 
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Clause of the First Amendment, we decline to determine that the pastor-member 
relationship in this case established a fiduciary duty.”240 
 
Analysis  
 Although some courts have summarily dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims, when 
raised against clergy members or church entities, as tantamount to clergy malpractice claims, this 
analysis, while simple, is incorrect.  Courts should distinguish between the claims of clergy 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty and recognize that the First Amendment problems that 
arise from defining a standard for clergy malpractice are not always present when adjudicating a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.     
As stated previously, the First Amendment does offer some protection to clergy members 
and church entities; however, it should not be seen as a complete bar to tort claims against 
religious leaders or organizations.  First, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
that although the First Amendment does offer absolute protection for belief, the same absolute 
protection does not exist for conduct.241  If it is demonstrated that the conduct at issue was rooted 
in religious beliefs, then the court must determine whether the law regulating the conduct is 
neutral both on its face and in its purpose.242  An individual's religious beliefs do not excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.  The regulation is proper if the court applies neutral principles of law to regulate the 
conduct. 
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 Courts must avoid becoming heavily entangled in religious doctrine and practice when 
adjudicating claims against clergy or church entities.  A claim for clergy malpractice would 
require a court to define a professional standard by which a clergy member’s conduct could be 
measured.  To recover for a claim of clergy malpractice, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to 
assert a professional standard of care followed by other clerics in the community.243  Defining 
such standards forces the court to investigate and review the skill, training, and standards 
required of clergy members in different religions, denominations, and sects.244  Furthermore, 
defining such a standard would require courts to identify the beliefs and practices of the relevant 
religion and then to determine whether the clergyman had acted in accordance with them.245  
Undertaking such a task causes courts to become heavily entangled in religious doctrine and 
practice.246  For that very reason it is clear that a claim for clergy malpractice must fall.   
“While a claim of clergy malpractice may require a court to examine ecclesiastical 
doctrine, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty raises secular issues, which can be adjudicated using 
neutral principals of law.”247  Unlike a claim for clergy malpractice, a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty does not necessarily require a court to become heavily entangled in religious 
doctrine and practice.     
In analyzing a breach of breach of fiduciary duty claim, it is important to recognize that a 
clergy-parishioner relationship, when a counseling relationship is entered into between the 
parties, can be fiduciary.  For a fiduciary relationship to exist, there must be an “interaction that 
creates trust and reliance,” allowing one party to occupy a superior position to another.248  A 
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fiduciary is defined as “a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for 
the benefit of another in matters connected with the undertaking.”249  Trust and confidence are 
vital to the counseling relationship between parishioner and pastor, and the pastor accepts 
fiduciary responsibilities by accepting a parishioner for counseling.250       
Even though a fiduciary duty usually arises in the context of the management of money, 
this is not necessary for the imposition of a fiduciary duty.251  Numerous courts have allowed 
fiduciary relationships to exist outside of the context of the management of money or property.  
Aside from the numerous courts listed above that have imposed a fiduciary duty on clergy 
members, a social worker has also been found to be a fiduciary to a client.252  Additionally, non-
physician mental health counselors have been held to have fiduciary relationships with their 
patients.253  Fiduciary duties have also been found between family members,254 and unmarried 
cohabitants.255  Although a clergy-parishioner counseling relationship is not traditionally viewed 
as a fiduciary relationship, the nature of the relationship, and strong public policy supports the 
imposition of fiduciary duties in some circumstances.     
 Apparent from the cases discussed previously, claims against clergy members or church 
entities for breach of fiduciary duties, generally arise out of a counseling relationship.  These 
relationships are inherently fiduciary.  Even without examining the cases listed above, it should 
be apparent, that the central characteristics of a fiduciary relationship exist in the pastoral 
counseling relationship.    When a parishioner seeks counseling from his or her clergy, the trust 
                                                 
 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997). 
249 Lindsay Rosen, RECENT DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty By 
the Clergy – F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 751 citing to Destafano v. 
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). 
250
251 Stevenson v. Johnson, 32 Va. Cir. 157, 159 (1993) 
252 Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1985). 
253 Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Alburquerque, 953 P.2d 722, 727-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). 
254 Swenson v. Wintercorn, 234 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
255 Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Mass. 1989). 
 34 
and reliance placed upon the clergy member is innate.  The imbalance of power between the 
parties is even more apparent between a cleric and parishioner, than between other mental-health 
care counselors and their patients.  As stated by Judge Miller in Langford v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of New York, “[t]he hallmark of fiduciary duty—an imbalance of power between the 
parties, is especially manifest in the relationship between a priest and parishioner.”256   
 While a fiduciary relationship can be established between a clergy member and 
parishioner, in order to recover for a breach of fiduciary duty claim a parishioner must also 
establish an attendant fiduciary duty, and that the duty was breached.257  A fiduciary’s 
obligations to the dependent party include the duty of loyalty and the duty to exercise reasonable 
skill and care, and thus the fiduciary is liable for harm resulting from breach of the duties 
imposed by the existence of such a relationship.258  It is establishing a fiduciary duty and breach 
of that duty that causes problems for many courts.     
As shown above, various courts have chosen to alleviate these problems by simply 
finding that allowing a breach of fiduciary duty claim would require that the court create a 
reasonable clergy standard by which the clergy member’s conduct could be evaluated.  This 
allows the court to dismiss the claim as tantamount to an impermissible clergy malpractice claim, 
a claim universally rejected as violating the First Amendment.  By doing so, the courts are able 
to free themselves from the detailed discussion of any difficult First Amendment issues.       
While the analysis of courts that have summarily dismissed breach of fiduciary duty 
claims as tantamount to clergy malpractice may be weak, the analysis of courts finding that a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim can be maintained against a clergy member has not been much 
better.  Many of these courts have gotten around any First Amendment problems by ignoring any 
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religious component of the pastoral counseling relationship, choosing instead to evaluate the 
actions of the pastor-counselor based on a standard of care defined by secular counselors.   
This was the approach followed by the Fifth Circuit in Sanders v. Casa View Baptist 
Church. 259  In that case the Court allowed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a clergy 
member, stating that the claim was proper because the jury found that “Baucum (the pastor) held 
himself out as possessing the education and experience of a professional marriage counselor, 
[and they judged] his counseling activities with the plaintiffs not by a standard of care defined by 
religious teachings, but by a professional standard of care developed through expert testimony 
describing what a reasonably prudent counselor would have done under the same or similar 
circumstances.”260  The Fifth Circuit decided the case by comparing the clergy member’s actions 
to a professional marriage counselor standard, without addressing any differences between a 
religious counselor and a secular counselor.      
However, this strained analysis is not necessary.  Courts faced with cases in which a 
clergy member enters into a sexual relationship with a parishioner during the course of pastoral 
counseling could evaluate the claim as a conflict of interest case, without fear of having to 
evaluate church doctrine or ignoring the differences between a pastoral counselor and a secular 
counselor.  “Persons occupying a fiduciary relationship towards others are not permitted to 
assume positions which bring their private interests into conflict with the interests of those to 
whom they owe the fiduciary duty.”261  The fiduciary is under a duty to act for the benefit of the 
other party, not for his or her own self-interest.  The fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty to the other 
person.  Evaluating these cases by looking at whether the fiduciary acted in his or her own self-
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interests, and not in the interests of the person in the inferior position, the parishioner, would not 
require a court to evaluate religious matters or church doctrine.   
In the case of a clergy member entering into sexual relations with a parishioner, the 
analysis is straightforward.  When the cleric enters into a sexual relationship with the 
parishioner, it is clearly not in the parishioner’s best interests.  The sexual relationship is often 
the cause of future mental problems for the parishioner, and when it occurs while the parishioner 
is married it routinely causes the break up of the marriage.  It should also be apparent that the 
clergy member is entering into the sexual relationship for his or her own sexual gratification, not 
for the best interests of the parishioner.  This conflict allows the court to find a breach of 
fiduciary duty without resorting to an evaluation of the church doctrine.   
The court is only required to evaluate whether the clergy member has acted in his or her 
own interests or the interests of the parishioner.  That the relationship is one that involves an 
authority or adherent of a religion is only relevant to the nature of the power differential in 
establishing the fiduciary character of the relationship.  The court will only need to determine 
whether there was a relationship in which there was an interaction of trust and reliance from 
which one of the parties was under a duty to act for the benefit of another, and failed to do so—
this does not require an examination of religious tenets or beliefs, but rather an examination of 
the individual relationship between the parties.  Therefore, a court will not have to become 
entangled in a religion when examining whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty.      
 Additionally, strong public policy supports the imposition of fiduciary duties upon clergy 
members who undertake to counsel their parishioners.  Exemplified by the enumerated cases 
above, many of the claims arise from a clergy member taking sexual advantage of a parishioner.  
When a parishioner seeks counseling from a cleric, they are generally very vulnerable, and trust 
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that the parishioner has their best interests in mind.  Additionally, the parishioner may be even 
more vulnerable when seeking counseling from a cleric, as opposed to a secular counselor, 
because the cleric may have additional authority over the parishioner due to his or her position as 
a religious leader.  The government has a strong interest in protecting society from such heinous 
actions and not allowing the First Amendment to be used as a shield from liability for neutral and 
generally applicable tort law.  There is no reason to exempt a clergy member from law that 
would protect the same parishioner if a secular counselor committed similar acts. 
 
Conclusion 
 While some courts have continued to hold that breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
churches and their clergy are identical to impermissible clergy malpractice claims, there are 
differences between the claims.  While clergy malpractice has been universally rejected, 
numerous courts have pointed out that breach of fiduciary duty claims do not raise the same First 
Amendment issues.  Adjudication of a breach of fiduciary duty claim only requires a court to use 
pre-existing secular standards of care to which all fiduciaries are held. 262  Therefore, courts faced 
with the question of whether to allow a claim for breach of fiduciary duty should not hastily 
conclude that the claim is indistinguishable from clergy malpractice, instead these courts should 
find that clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty are distinguishable and find that while 
the First Amendment is an automatic bar to the former, it is not necessarily a bar to the latter. 
As these claims continue to be filed at higher rates throughout the country, it is important 
that courts nationwide begin to develop an analysis that will allow recovery for parishioners who 
have suffered grievous harm.  An appropriate breach of fiduciary duty analysis will allow courts 
to adjudicate these claims without running the risk of violating the First Amendment. 
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